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EXPOSURE DRAFT 
PROPOSED REVISION OF STATEMENT OF 
TAX POLICY NUMBER 8 
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
AUGUST 1, 1986 
Prepared by the Federal Taxation Division 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Comments should be received by September 12, 1986 and addressed to 
William R. Stromsem, Assistant Director, Federal Taxation Division 
AICPA, 1620 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 
SUMMARY 
The proposed revision updates and provides additional supporting material for Tax Policy Statement Number 8 which was 
published in 1980. The Tax Policy Statement proposes revisions to the Social Security system to make it actuarially more 
sound and to provide a fairer relationship between contributions and benefits. 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 (212) 575-6200 Telex: 70-3396 
Telecopier (212) 575-3846 
A u g u s t 1 , 1986 
Accompanying this letter is an exposure draft of a proposed 
revision to Tax Policy Statement Number 8, "Suggested 
Improvements for the Social Security Retirement System." This 
revision updates and provides additional statistical support for 
the original tax policy statement which was published in 1980. 
The proposed revision was developed by the Social Security Task 
Force and has been approved by two thirds or more of the members 
of the Tax Policy Subcommittee and the Executive Committee of the 
tax division. The tax division's procedures call for tax policy 
statements to be exposed to members of the tax division and to 
other leaders in the accounting profession. 
Comments on the exposure draft will be considered by the Tax 
Policy Subcommittee, and revisions made when deemed appropriate. 
A "final draft" is then approved by the subcommittee by a vote of 
two-thirds or more, and is sent to members of the division for an 
"advisory poll." If only minor changes are made in the final 
draft, the text will not be sent to division members again, so 
please retain this exposure draft for reference in the advisory 
poll. The final draft is then sent to the tax division Executive 
Committee, along with comments on the exposure draft and results 
of the advisory poll. After approval by two thirds or more of 
the Executive Committee, the document is published as a Tax 
Policy Statement. 
Your comments on the exposure draft are important and encouraged. 
Tax policy statements form the basis for positions taken on 
behalf of the AICPA by the tax division. Our procedures, 
including this exposure draft are intended to produce an 
informative and well-reasoned document. 
Sincerely, 
Albert B. Ellentuck 
Chairman 
AICPA Tax Division Executive Committee 
Arthur M. Friedman 
Chairman 
AICPA Tax Division Tax Policy Subcommittee 
AICPA 
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Statement of Tax Policy 
The Social Security Retirement System 
This statement of tax policy presents the recommendations of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) for 
improving the Social Security retirement system. These recommendations are based on Tax Policy Analysis Number 8, The Social 
Security Retirement System, prepared by the AICPA Tax Division. 
Statements of tax policy are approved by the Executive Committee of the AICPA Federal Taxation Division after they are developed 
by the Division's tax policy subcommittee. They represent the views of the Institute on key policy issues. The conclusions reached in the 
Statements are based on the conditions existent at the time the Statements are issued. The Institute periodically reviews and, if necessary, 
reissues or revises outstanding tax policy statements. Given the fact that the economic and legislative environment existing when a state-
ment is issued can change dramatically in a relatively short period of time, it is possible that the Statement may, at a given point in time, no 
longer represent the views of the Institute. Thus, should the need to know the Institute's current position arise, the reader should check with 
the AICPA Federal Taxation Division to determine the current status of this Statement. 
Summary of Recommendations 
Since the issuance of Statement of Tax Policy 8 in 1980, there have been several important legislative and administrative actions that 
have significantly affected the Social Security program. In particular, the President's National Commission on Social Security Reform 
examined the Social Security system and concluded that Congress "should not alter the fundamental structure of the Social Security pro-
gram or undermine its fundamental principles."1 Subsequent to the Commission's report, the Congress enacted amendments to the Social 
Security Act in 1983 that incorporated many of the Commission's recommendations (an acceleration of legislated future tax increases, 
increases in the self-employment tax, increases in the retirement age, and increases in the scope of coverage). Several of these changes were 
advocated in Statement of Tax Policy 8. However, the 1983 amendments did not alter the fundamental premise on which the system 
was founded. 
The AICPA maintains that a change in philosophy in the Social Security program is necessary if the program is to remain viable and 
continue to receive public support in the long run. The need for such a change will be particularly acute as the Social Security program 
enters into the 21st century. During the early part of that century, the number of beneficiaries will increase dramatically relative to the 
number of workers who must bear the burden of funding retirement benefits. Without any changes in the system, it is projected that the 
Social Security system will once again begin incurring substantial deficits during this period.2 To sustain the current benefit payout struc-
ture, it will be necessary to raise payroll taxes, perhaps by as much as 10 percentage points over the scheduled rates. 
Because payroll taxes cannot continue to rise at this rate, these recommendations focus on the benefits taxpayers should receive from 
the system. If adopted, these recommendations could prevent long-term operating deficits for the retirement portion of the Social Security 
system and could allow for some reduction in Social Security taxes. In addition, these proposals would significantly simplify the system and 
make it more equitable. 
The recommendations of the AICPA are as follows: 
1. The present three tiered benefit structure that weights benefits in favor of low wage earners should be replaced 
by a level benefit structure in which benefits are directly related to each worker's contributions to the retire-
ment system.3 An individual's total contributions would include the retirement portion of both the employee 
and employer-paid contributions, increased by an earnings factor that includes a real rate of return. This 
amount would be the basis for the earned retirement benefit. In order to receive the same retirement annuities, 
self-employed persons should contribute an amount equal to the total amount contributed by both the 
employee and the employer. 
The present system generally pays out retirement benefits in excess of the amounts that would be received on 
the basis of an individual's total contributions to the system. These excess benefits in effect constitute welfare-
type payments.4 Such excess benefits should be subjected to a needs test and funded by federal general 
revenues, but should not be part of the Social Security system. 
Under this benefit proposal, the amounts paid out of the Social Security program to persons currently receiving 
benefits in excess of an actuarially determined amount (primarily low and middle-wage earners and single-
wage earner couples) would be reduced. However, the total benefits received by these persons would not be 
reduced because the "needs" portion of the retirement benefit would be shifted to the Supplemental Security 
Income program and funded by general revenues. In addition, for present and near-term retirees, the current 
level of scheduled benefits should be guaranteed without tests of need, but the excess of the amounts that they 
receive over the amounts that they would collect under the earned computation plan should come from the 
SSI program. 
2. Settlement options selected at the time of retirement should include (1) a joint-and-survivor annuity (for 
married couples), (2) a single-life annuity, or (3) an annuity with a guaranteed refund feature under which the 
total retirement contributions (increased by an earnings factor that reflects a real rate of return) would be 
guaranteed to either the retiree or the estate. Each individual's contributions would determine the eventual 
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retirement benefits. In the event of death prior to retirement, the contributions credits or a lump sum distribu-
tion would become part of the estate and could be passed to a surviving spouse or other legatee. Where both 
spouses are alive at the retirement of one (or both) marriage partner(s), it would be desirable for the joint-and-
survivor election to be mandatory. This would protect a surviving spouse who has no contributions record of his 
or her own from having all Social Security benefits ended by the death of the other spouse. There could be pro-
visions made for a couple to elect out of the mandatory joint-and-survivor election if both spouses have earnings 
records in their own right. 
This recommendation would eliminate much of the inequity arising under the present system (1) when persons 
are taxed and die before retirement age without having eligible dependents and (2) when one spouse dies after 
both have contributed to the system during working years. It would also eliminate the bias that currently exists 
against single persons and many two wage-earner couples.5 
3. The current concept of funding the Social Security retirement system should be retained. Presently, con-
tributions paid in by workers and their employers are used to pay benefits to current retirees (this is often 
referred to as the "pay-as-you-go" concept). A trust fund exists to serve as a contingency fund in case there is an 
imbalance between contributions received and benefits paid out. Ideally, such a fund should be able to provide 
a cushion of between six and nine months of benefit payments. If the Social Security program was "fully fun-
ded," the benefit fund would be so enormous that it could have a significant effect on the capital and bond 
markets. Retention of the "pay-as-you-go" concept will leave the trust funds vulnerable to dramatic shifts in 
demographic conditions (especially the ratio of current workers to retirees). However, the shifting of the welfare 
burden from the Social Security trust funds to federal general revenues will lessen the tax burden on future 
generations of workers. Short-term imbalances may still arise, in which case interfund borrowing or transfers 
from the general fund may be necessary to keep the funds in actuarial balance. 
4. The retirement annuity should begin at what society determines to be an appropriate "normal retirement age" 
(e.g., age 65), unless actuarially reduced benefits beginning at some earlier age have been elected, regardless of 
the participant's employment status. If early retirement is permitted, the initial annuity should be based on 
contributions up to that retirement date. Wages after early retirement should be subject to Social Security tax-
ation until normal retirement age, thus requiring an annual recomputation of the retirement annuity. 
Discontinuing the Social Security taxation on earnings after normal retirement age is reached would eliminate 
all inequities in the present rules concerning work after that age. Many persons have difficulty explaining why 
individuals who need income should be penalized (i.e., subjected to Social Security taxation and loss of Social 
Security benefits) for working, whereas persons with large amounts of investment income (and thus large 
equity interests) collect full Social Security benefits.6 
5. For income tax purposes, the retirement portion of the Social Security tax assessed against employees and self-
employed persons should be deductible when it is paid (preferably as a deduction in computing adjusted gross 
income), and retirement benefits should be fully taxable when they are received. The employer's contribution 
should continue to be deductible by the employer. Because lump-sum distributions (the result either of death 
before retirement age or of the guaranteed refund feature) would be subject to income tax, Congress should con-
sider some form of income averaging. A phase-in period should be allowed in order to prevent taxation of 
benefits resulting from past contributions that were not deductible. Allowing for the deductibility of the 
employee's portion of the Social Security tax would result in a significant reduction in federal income tax 
receipts (perhaps as much as $30 billion under 1985 rates). This would be partially offset when Social Security 
benefits become fully taxable. 
6. Coverage under Social Security should be mandatory for all workers. Exceptions should continue to exist for 
short-term nonresident alien workers. 
7. The concept of earnings sharing should be explored as one means by which the contributions records of each 
spouse would be determined. Under a pure form of earnings sharing, the contributions of each spouse would be 
combined and divided equally during the period of marriage. Each spouse would have a separate earnings 
record and could make the decision to retire independently of the other spouse. Earnings sharing would also 
alleviate the inequity that results under the current system when one spouse spends a significant period of time 
out of covered employment (e.g., to care for children) and does not qualify for benefits based on the other 
spouse's earnings record (e.g., the marriage lasted less than ten years). Despite the simplicity of the concept of 
earnings sharing, implementation of such a system would be complex and would probably need to be phased in 
over a number of years.7 An alternative to earnings sharing would be to treat an individual's contributions 
record as a property interest that would be subject to division in any settlement resulting from the dissolution of 
a marriage. 
Maintaining the Safety Net 
The foregoing recommendations are directed at improving the nation's mandatory retirement system. The major thrust of these 
recommendations is that welfare, the actuarially unearned portion of the benefits from the Social Security system, should be transferred to 
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the general revenues budget and subjected to a needs test. Welfare should be an expenditure out of general revenues, not payroll tax 
revenues. To protect low income retirees from falling below a pre-determined minimum level of income protection, it is recommended that 
the following additional goals be adopted in conjunction with the suggested changes to the Social Security program: 
1. The Social Security program should be viewed as one part of a broader national retirement income program, the 
other two parts being private savings and employment-related pension programs. The role of Social Security 
should be to provide a basic floor of protection for every worker who has spent a substantial portion of his or her 
working life under the Social Security program and earned at least the average covered wage, but not to provide 
the sole means of retirement support. In cases where Social Security, other pension benefits, and savings fail to 
provide a determined minimum level of income, the funds needed to bring an individual to such an income level 
should come from a program such as the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. Use of the SSI program 
to fund income transfer payments is more equitable because it is means-tested and is part of the general 
revenues budget. 
2. Congress should continue to provide initiatives for private savings and mandate more uniform pension laws to 
promote pension equity. However, a goal of providing a level of retirement income that will enable all 
individuals to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living should not be a part of a national income policy. 
The legislation of any mandated universal pension plan (such as the Minimum Universal Pension System 
(MUPS) recommended by the President's Commission on Pension Policy in 1981) should not be enacted.8 The 
government should take actions to encourage people to plan for their income needs at retirement, but it seems 
inappropriate for the federal government to require everyone to forego current consumption in favor of a 
specified level of retirement benefits. 
3. There should be a federally funded study to establish a valid minimum income level for retired persons and to 
examine the economic implications of these recommendations. Retirees have much different income needs 
than persons who are working and/or who have families to support. Any minimum income level needs to take 
such considerations into account if it is to be valid. 
Implications of Adopting These Recommendations 
The shift of welfare payments from the Social Security program could permit a reduction, or at least prevent an increase, in Social 
Security taxes. However, the need for general revenue (primarily from the income tax) could increase. The tax reduction for Social Security 
could exceed the needed additional income tax revenue because of the implementation of the means test under the SSI program. The entire 
Social Security tax reduction should result in reduced labor costs (especially to labor-intensive small businesses) and increased economic 
activity, which, in turn, could help reduce unemployment, lower inflation, and increase capital formation. 
The recommendations set forth in this Tax Policy Statement should be viewed as an integrated plan for change in the Social Security 
program. Although certain of the recommendations could be implemented without adopting the entire set of recommendations (e.g., 
recommendations 3,4,5,6, and 7 could be enacted individually without adopting recommendations 1 and 2), the AICPA believes that the 
recommendations should be considered together and not piecemeal. 
Adoption of these recommendations would represent a radical departure from the premise on which the Social Security system has 
operated almost since its inception. In particular, the emphasis under this proposal is on the principle of individual equity as the primary 
goal of the Social Security program. Individual equity is achieved when each person's Social Security benefits are actuarially based on that 
person's lifetime contributions. Currently, the primary emphasis of the Social Security program is on "social adequacy," which has been 
defined as a "welfare objective."9 
It is highly likely that benefits paid out of the Social Security program would be reduced to many beneficiaries as a result of adopting an 
annuity approach (total benefits to low income persons would not necessarily be reduced, however, because of the SSI supplement). Such 
benefit reductions could be cause for political concern. However, there is no room left in the Social Security program for political measures 
that lack fiscal integrity. Difficult decisions will have to be made now if future workers can be expected to continue to support the system. 
Such support is essential to future beneficiaries, who are dependent on the payments made by the current workers of that period. The time 
for debate on long range issues is now, while the Social Security program is expected to experience a period of solvency. If debate is 
postponed until another crisis, the solutions will once again be based on expediency and not on reasoned debate. 
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A Basic Description of the Program 
The Social Security system is composed of four distinct programs. The objective of three of these programs (the old-age, survivors, and 
disability programs) is to replace part of the earnings lost to a family due to the retirement, death, or disability of a wage earner in the 
family. The fourth program (the hospital program) is designed to provide health care for the elderly. Each of these four programs will be 
briefly described in this section. 
Old-age insurance (OAI) program 
The old-age insurance program is the largest and most visible of the four Social Security programs. It is responsible for providing monthly 
cash retirement benefits to qualifying beneficiaries and their dependents. In fiscal year 1984 this program paid 25.1 million beneficiaries 
more than $119 billion in retirement benefits.1 Retired workers averaged approximately $5,025 per year in benefits, while their spouse 
beneficiaries averaged approximately $3,200 per year. 
A person qualifies for retirement benefits in one of two ways, either as an "insured worker" or as a member of an insured worker's 
family. There are five levels of insured status, and the level attained by the worker affects not only the availability of retirement benefits, 
but also survivorship, disability, and hospital benefits. 
A worker may first apply for retirement benefits upon reaching age 62 only if the worker is "fully insured." The determination of fully 
insured status is made by totaling a worker's "quarters of coverage." A quarter of coverage is measured by a prescribed dollar amount of 
annual wages or self-employment income that has been subject to the Social Security tax. For 1985, employees and self-employed persons 
receive one quarter of coverage for each $410 of covered annual wages, up to a maximum of four quarters per year (i.e., a worker who has 
$1,640 of covered wages or self-employment income in 1985 receives credit for four quarters of coverage). The amount of covered wages that 
represents a quarter of coverage is indexed annually by multiplying the ratio of the average annual covered wage from the second preceding 
year (for 1985, the numerator would be the average covered wage from 1983) over the average annual covered wage from 1976 times $250. 
This amount is rounded to the nearest multiple of 10. For a person reaching age 62 in 1985, the minimum number of quarters necessary to 
qualify for retirement benefits is 34. This will increase to 36 quarters in 1987 and 40 quarters in 1991. 
Certain dependents of a fully insured retired worker may also qualify for benefits based on the worker's earnings record. These depen-
dents may be summarized as: 
1. A spouse, age 62 or older; 
2. An unmarried child under age 18 (age 19 if still in high school); 
3. A disabled unmarried child; 
4. A spouse under age 62 if he or she is caring for the retired worker's child who is under age 16 or disabled, provided 
the child is receiving a benefit based on the retired worker's earnings record; and 
5. A divorced spouse age 62 and older may also qualify for benefits based on an ex-spouse's earnings record if the 
marriage lasted for 10 years or more. 
The computation of the monthly retirement benefit will be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
Survivorship insurance (SI) program 
The survivorship insurance program is responsible for providing benefits to qualifying dependents of a deceased worker who was 
"currently insured" at the time of death. The survivorship program is the second largest of the four programs in terms of dollar outlay, pay-
ing $36.2 billion to more than 7.1 million beneficiaries in fiscal year 1984.2 Benefits to surviving spouses averaged approximately $5,690 per 
year in 1984. 
Survivorship benefits are restricted to those dependents of currently insured workers. The number of quarters of coverage necessary to 
be considered currently insured increases as a worker grows older. Regardless of age, a worker will be considered currently insured if he or 
she has at least 6 quarters of coverage during the 13 quarter period ending with the calendar quarter in which death occurred. 
Dependents who may qualify for survivorship benefits can be summarized as: 
1. A spouse, age 60 or older; 
2. An unmarried child under age 18; 
3. A disabled unmarried child; 
4. A spouse or divorced spouse who is caring for the worker's child who is under age 16 or disabled, provided the 
child is receiving a benefit based on the deceased worker's earnings record; 
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5. A spouse, age 50 or older, who becomes disabled within 7 years after the worker's death; 
6. A worker's dependent parents age 62 or older; and 
7. A divorced spouse may qualify for benefits if the marriage lasted for at least 10 years. 
Disability insurance (DI) program 
The disability insurance program is responsible for providing benefits to currently disabled workers who have "disability insured" 
status and to qualifying dependents of the worker. The disability insurance program is the smallest of the four programs, paying out $17.7 
billion to 3.8 million beneficiaries during fiscal year 1984.3 Disabled workers received an average benefit of approximately $6,020 per 
year in 1984. 
A worker qualifies for disability payments if that worker is "disability insured." Disability insured status is attained if the worker has 
at least 20 quarters of coverage during the 40 quarter period ending with the quarter in which the disability occurred. Special provisions 
exist for younger workers. In all cases, the disability must be such that it prevents gainful employment, and such disability is expected to 
last for at least 12 months or result in death. 
Disability payments are available to a disabled worker up to the age of 65 and to the same set of dependents who are eligible for a 
worker's retirement benefits. 
Hospital insurance (HI) program 
The hospital insurance program, which is one part of Medicare, is responsible for subsidizing much of the cost of health care for persons 
age 65 and over. Medicare is composed of two parts, hospital insurance (Part A) and supplementary medical insurance (Part B). Part A 
covers inpatient hospital care, while Part B covers doctor's services, outpatient hospital care, and medical supplies. Part B is part of the 
Social Security system even though it is not financed by any part of the payroll tax. The hospital insurance program paid out $42.1 billion to 
approximately 26.9 million beneficiaries during fiscal year 1984.4 
Financing the Social Security Program 
The dollars needed to finance the Social Security programs are raised through the imposition of a tax on the wages of employees in 
' 'covered employment'' and on net income derived from self-employment. These dollars are allocated among three trust funds, the Old-Age 
and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, the Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund, and the Hospital Insurance (HI) Trust Fund. The 
trust fund reserves are invested in interest bearing obligations of the U.S. government or in exclusively issued public debt obligations. The 
average interest rate earned by these funds in fiscal year 1984 was 11.1 percent.5 
Despite the existence of trust funds for each Social Security program, it is important to recognize that the Social Security system is not 
actuarially funded. Instead, the system operates on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, with the funds currently received being used to finance the 
current benefits. This method of operation, also referred to as "current cost" financing, attempts to match current year revenues with 
current year expenditures. The trust funds serve as contingency reserves to guard against fluctuations due to unforeseen changes in 
economic conditions. 
The "pay-as-you-go'' approach to financing the Social Security programs creates unique inter-generational compacts between current 
beneficiaries, current workers, and future generations of workers. In the absence of any funded retirement system, the tax rate borne by 
current workers becomes a function not of their future retirement benefits, but rather it is determined by the level of current retirement 
benefits. Current workers must then rely on future workers to continue to support the retirement system when they retire. 
Who is taxed 
Although Social Security payments are often characterized as "contributions," participation in the Social Security program is, for the 
most part, mandatory for both employers and employees and self-employed persons. More than 90 percent of the current workforce (119 
million workers in fiscal year 1984) is covered under the Social Security program. Prior to the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act, 
the following groups of workers were exempt from participation in the program: 
1. Federal civilian employees covered under another U.S. retirement system; 
2. Employees of state and municipal governments that were not covered by a Federal-State agreement or that 
elected to withdraw from the program; and 
3. Employees of certain non-profit organizations that had not arranged for Social Security coverage. 
The 1983 Amendments extended coverage on a mandatory basis to newly hired federal employees and current and future employees of 
non-profit organizations. In addition, the amendments prohibited state and local governments from electing out of the system after April 
20,1983. 
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What is taxed 
The Social Security tax is a payroll tax, applied only to the "covered" wages of employees and the net employment income of self-
employed persons. Passive sources of income such as investment income, rents, and capital gains are not subject to the Social Security tax. 
The maximum amount of total wages and net self-employment income that is subject to tax is defined as the "contribution and benefit 
base." For 1985, this ceiling is set at $39,600. This amount is indexed each year by the ratio of the average covered wage from the second pre-
ceding year over the average covered wage from the third preceding year (for 1985, the index was the 1983 average covered wage ($15,239.24) 
divided by the 1982 average covered wage ($14,531.34) times the 1984 contribution and benefit base ($37,800)). The resulting number is 
rounded to the nearest multiple of $300. For 1986, the contribution and benefit base is scheduled to increase to $42,000. 
How much is taxed 
The Social Security tax itself is a flat rate that is applied to covered earnings up to the contribution and benefit base. Employers and 
employees split the flat rate evenly, while self-employed persons are subject to the entire rate. Prior to the 1983 Amendments to the Social 
Security Act, self-employed persons paid a rate that was approximately two-thirds the combined employer-employee rate. Under a transi-
tion provision, self-employed persons will receive a credit against their federal income tax of 2.7 percent times covered wages in 1984, 2.3 
percent in 1985, and 2.0 percent in 1986-1989. Beginning in 1990, self-employed persons will be allowed a deduction against their federal 
taxable income of one-half of their total Social Security tax paid. For 1984 only, employees (but not employers) also received a credit against 
their federal income tax of 0.3 percent of covered wages. Employees are not permitted to deduct any of their Social Security taxes against 
their taxable income. 
The total Social Security tax rate levied in 1985 is 7.05 percent each for employers and employees and 14.1 percent for self-employed 
persons. The combined employer-employee rate is allocated to the three trust funds in the following manner in 1985: 
OASI: 10.4% 
DI: 1.0% 
HI: 2.7% 
Under current law, the combined rate is scheduled to increase to 14.30 percent in 1986, with additional increases scheduled to take 
effect in 1990 and 2000, reaching a maximum combined rate of 15.3 percent (7.65 percent each for employers and employees). These rates 
are subject to change if economic conditions precipitate a shortfall or surplus in the trust funds. 
Computing Social Security Benefit Amounts 
A worker's initial monthly retirement or disability benefit is based on the worker's "primary insurance amount" (PIA). The PIA 
becomes the base from which almost all of the cash benefits are computed, including dependents and survivorship benefits. 
There are currently five basic types of PIA computation methods. They are: 1) PIA table method, 2) wage-indexed formula 
method, 3) transitional guarantee method, 4) old-start method, and 5) special minimum method. The wage-indexed formula method 
will apply to the vast majority of workers who reach age 62 after 1978 or become disabled before reaching age 62. The mechanics of this 
method will be briefly summarized in this section. 
Waged indexed formula method 
The wage-indexed formula method was introduced in the 1977 Amendments to the Social Security Act to apply to beneficiaries reach-
ing age 62 after 1978. The objective of this method is to index a retiree's past covered earnings to reflect increases in the average covered 
wages of all workers over the worker's period of employment. Under this formula, a worker's actual covered wages for each year up to and 
including the second year before the year in which the worker turns 62, dies or becomes disabled are indexed by multiplying the actual 
covered wage times the following ratio: 
Average covered annual wage in the second year 
prior to age 62, death or disability 
average covered annual wage in the year indexed 
Those wages not indexed are included in the formula at their actual amounts. 
The computation period used in the formula consists of the years beginning after 1950 or age 21 (whichever is later) and extending up to 
the year in which the worker becomes 62, dies, or becomes disabled (whichever is earliest). The five years of lowest indexed earnings are 
dropped, and years of earnings beginning with age 62 are substituted for years of lower indexed earnings included in the computation 
period. 
The remaining indexed and actual wages in the computation period are summed and divided by the number of months in the computa-
tion period to produce an "average indexed monthly earning" (AIME). The AIME becomes the basis for the computation of the 
worker's PIA. 
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The PIA is computed by applying three separate percentage rates to portions of the AIME. The dollar amounts of AIME at which the 
percentage rate changes are referred to as "bend points." As originally enacted for 1979, the PIA percentage rates and bend points 
were: 
90% x first $180 of AIME, plus 
32% x AIME over $180 and through $1085, plus 
15% x AIME over $1085. 
The bend points are indexed each year by multiplying the bend point times the ratio of the average annual covered wage for the second 
preceding year over the average annual covered wage for 1977. The bend points for 1985 are as follows: 
90% x first $280 of AIME, plus 
32% x AIME over $280 and through $1691, plus 
15% x AIME over $1691. 
The amount computed using this formula is rounded to the next lower multiple of $.10. A complete example of the operation of this formula 
is presented in an appendix to this chapter. It should be emphasized that the benefit received is strictly a function of covered wages. At no 
time does the actual amount of tax paid enter into the computation. 
Once the PIA is computed, future benefits are automatically increased (subject to Congressional approval) to reflect changes in the 
cost of living index (CPI). If the CPI monthly average for the third quarter of the current year is at least 3 percent higher than in the third 
quarter of the preceding year, the monthly benefit is increased by the increase in the CPI, effective in January of the next year. Should the 
CPI increase not exceed 3 percent, Congress may still authorize an increase in Social Security benefits if it chooses to do so. 
Adjustments to the monthly benefit 
There are three major adjustments that can affect the amount of monthly benefit actually received. These adjustments may be 
classified as 1) an actuarial reduction or increase to the PIA, 2) CPI increases and 3) a retirement test reduction. 
The actuarial reduction or increase factor is applied to the PIA if a worker retires prior to "normal retirement age" (age 65 in 1985) or 
continues working beyond normal retirement age. In 1985, a worker may apply for retirement benefits as early as age 62, but such benefits 
are reduced by 5/9 of 1 percent for each retirement month prior to age 65. For a person retiring at age 62 in 1985, the retirement benefit will be 
80 percent of the PIA. The amount of the reduction is scheduled to increase as the normal retirement age is raised. By the year 2005, the nor-
mal retirement age will be age 66 and the reduced benefit for retiring at age 62 will drop to 75 percent of the PIA. By the year 2022, the normal 
retirement age will be age 67 and the reduced benefit for retiring at age 62 will drop to 70 percent of the PIA. Conversely, if a worker continues 
working beyond age 65 in 1985, the monthly benefit is increased by 1/4 of 1 percent for each month worked beyond age 65 (or 3 percent per full 
year). In conjunction with the scheduled increases in normal retirement age, the actuarial increase factor is also scheduled to be increased 
for working beyond the normal retirement age, reaching a maximum of 8 percent per year by 2009. 
In addition to the automatic CPI adjustment applied to the monthly benefit after entitlement, the initial PIA is increased by the CPI 
factor for each year beginning with age 62 up to the last year of earnings. This is to compensate for the fact that such years are not indexed in 
the PIA computation formula. 
A final adjustment to the initial monthly benefit or to subsequent monthly benefits is the decrease in benefits due to covered wages or 
self-employment income earned during the retirement year. This "retirement test" applies to only those persons under age 70. Persons who 
reach age 70 may earn an unlimited amount of covered wages or self-employment income and still collect their full Social Security retire-
ment benefit. For persons between ages 65 through 69 during 1985, retirees are permitted to earn $610 per month ($7,320 per year) without 
suffering any loss of benefits. For each dollar earned above this amount, the retirement benefit is reduced by $.50. This amount drops to 
$.333 starting in 1990. The exempt amount for beneficiaries under age 65 during 1985 is $450 per month ($5,400 per year). It is important to 
note that only covered wages and self-employment income are subject to the retirement test. A retiree of any age may earn an unlimited 
amount of investment income during the retirement period without loss of Social Security benefits. The retirement test has been defended 
on the grounds that the Social Security program is designed to replace lost earnings, not to augment current earnings.6 
Computing benefits for dependents of the worker 
The worker's PIA becomes the base from which the retirement, survivorship and disability benefits of qualifying members of the 
worker's family are computed. Qualifying spouses and dependents are generally entitled to one-half of the worker's PIA, except that the 
total amount received by the worker and his or her family is limited to a "maximum family benefit" (MFB). The MFB is computed by 
applying four separate percentage rates to the worker's PIA. The MFB percentage rates and the PIA bend points for 1985 are as 
follows: 
150% x first $358 of the PIA, plus 
272% x the PIA over $358 and through $517; plus 
134% x the PIA over $517 and through $675; plus 
175% x the PIA over $675. 
The resulting sum is rounded to the next lower multiple of $.10. 
-13-
If the worker dies before or during retirement, a qualifying spouse is entitled to 100 percent of the worker's PIA and qualifying children 
are eligible for 75 percent of the PIA, up to the MFB. For a retired married couple where one spouse is collecting benefits based on the PIA of 
the other spouse, the total benefits received are analogous to a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity (the total benefit received by the sur-
viving spouse drops from 150 percent of the PIA to 100 percent of the PIA after the death of one of the spouses). 
In the case of a worker who dies before receiving any benefits, the worker's surviving spouse is entitled to a lump sum death benefit of 
not more than $255 in addition to survivorship benefits when he or she qualifies. For a married couple where both spouses are entitled to a 
retirement benefit based on their individual earnings records or for unmarried workers, the earnings credits earned by the deceased worker 
are non-transferrable and no part of any of the past "premiums" (taxes) paid are refunded to the deceased worker's estate. 
Income tax status of Social Security benefits 
Beginning in 1984, up to one-half of the Social Security benefits received by an individual or married couple may be subject to taxation 
as gross income (section 86 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). The following formula is used to determine if such benefits are 
taxable: 
Adjusted gross income (AGI) 
+ Tax-exempt interest income 
+ 1/2 of Social Security benefits received 
Total 
- Base amount ($25,000 if single, $32,000 if married filing jointly) 
Difference 
X 1/2 
Taxable benefit-(not to exceed one-half of the benefits received) 
Prior to 1984, the entire amount of Social Security benefits received was exempt from federal income taxation under a series of Internal 
Revenue Service rulings issued in 1938 and 1941. 
The Philosophical Foundation of the Social Security Program 
The principle that a tax system should result in equitable treatment of its taxpayers has traditionally been a standard by which tax sys-
tems are developed and evaluated. In the most frequent case, "equity" is measured on a relative basis. Do "equally situated" taxpayers pay 
the same amount of taxes (horizontal equity)? Do "unequally situated" taxpayers pay different amounts of taxes (vertical equity)? The 
emphasis in the definition of "equity" is on the relative amount of taxes paid, with little or no consideration given to the relative amount of 
benefits received in exchange for the payments. This is a reasonable approach in light of the difficulty that exists in determining and 
measuring the value (or utility) of each person's "public goods" received (e.g., highways, national defense) in exchange for taxes paid. 
The Social Security tax is unique from our other tax systems in that the direct benefits to be received as a result of paying the tax can be 
defined and measured in monetary terms. In fact, some have argued that Social Security payments are not "taxes" in the purest sense 
because there exists a direct measure between taxes paid and benefits received. Such persons would prefer to view the Social Security 
"taxes" as "contributions."7 The compulsory nature of these payments and the lack of any contractual guarantee (other than moral) of 
benefits reduces the validity of this argument considerably. 
This expansion of the equity concept from a relative to an absolute measure in evaluating the Social Security program would be 
appropriate if the sole purpose of the Social Security program was to function as a retirement annuity program, where each person's 
benefits were directly related to contributions made. Although many participants probably think of the program as such, it is more accurate 
to view Social Security as designed to provide economic security to those workers and their dependents who have lost their source of wages 
because of retirement, disability, or death. Social Security, as it presently functions, can better be described as "social insurance,'' with the 
distinction being that the program emphasizes the imputed need of the beneficiary over individual actuarial equity, the latter being 
measured on a quid pro quo basis. 
Social adequacy goals of the Social Security program 
The program goal of emphasizing imputed need over strict actuarial equity is most often referred to as the principle of "social ade-
quacy." Social adequacy has been defined as: 
a welfare objective in which an individual's benefit amount is determined, 
not by his or her contributions, but by (a) appropriate transfer of income 
from affluent to needy groups, and (b) a minimum standard of living beneath 
which society decides that no individual shall fall.8 
While this definition of social adequacy may be correct in principle, it fails to mention that under the current Social Security pro-
visions, there is no means test applied to the recipients of benefits. It is possible that an "affluent" person (as measured by total wealth) 
could collect the same benefit as a "needy" person and have paid in the same number of dollars in tax. It is also more accurate to say that the 
transfer of income does not necessarily come from the "affluent," whose income may be largely exempt from the Social Security tax (e.g., 
interest, dividends, capital gains, rents), but rather from the middle and low wage-earner, the single worker, or the two wage-earner 
couple. 
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If social adequacy was the sole objective of the program, there would be little concern for the correlation between taxes paid and 
benefits received. It could then be argued that such welfare objectives should more properly be funded by general revenues and not a payroll 
tax. Such is not the case, however. While policymakers admit that social adequacy is the primary objective of the program, they also have 
recognized that individual (actuarial) equity is important if the program is to continue to receive public support in the future. The 1979 
Advisory Council on Social Security recognized the importance of retaining some relationship between benefits and taxes when it stated, 
"all current and future workers should be able to expect that Social Security benefits generated by increased earnings will provide a reason-
able return on the increased employee tax payments on those earnings."9 
Striking an acceptable balance between social adequacy and individual equity is a difficult task because the two objectives are 
mutually exclusive. Provisions that promote the objective of social adequacy do so at the expense of individual equity. In addition, the fact 
that Social Security is not a funded plan requires that equity be considered from both an intragenerational and an intergenerational 
perspective. The Report of the Consultant Panel on Social Security states that: 
complete equity between generations demands that those different generations 
receive comparable benefit amounts in return for comparable contributions. 
Ultimate equity within a generation exists only if workers' benefits are direc-
tly proportional to the amounts of their contributions.10 
Recent pronouncements from Social Security policymakers and the Reagan Administration have tended to reinforce the goal of social 
adequacy as an essential component of the program. President Reagan's bipartisan National Commission on Social Security Reform 
unanimously agreed that: 
the Congress, in its deliberations on financing proposals, should not alter the 
fundamental structure of the Social Security program or undermine its fun-
damental principles. The National Commission considered, but rejected, 
proposals to make the Social Security program a voluntary one, or to transform 
it into a program under which benefits are a product exclusively of the con-
tributions paid, or to convert it into a fully-funded program, or to change it to 
a program under which benefits are conditioned on the showing of financial 
need.11 
The Economics of Social Security 
The Social Security program is currently the largest single program in the federal budget. Outlays for Social Security and Medicare are 
projected to comprise approximately 28 percent of total budget outlays for 1985. This is slightly more than the national defense outlays, 
which are estimated to comprise 25.5 percent of the budget.12 Receipts from Social Security taxes are currently the second largest source of 
federal tax revenues. For 1985, it is estimated that Social Security taxes will account for 37.7 percent of total federal tax revenues. This com-
pares to 44.9 percent for individual income taxes and 10.0 percent for corporate income taxes.13. 
The magnitude of the Social Security program is impressive in absolute terms. To appreciate the growing impact of the program on our 
economy, however, one only needs to examine the growth of the program during the past 25 years. The following two sections trace the 
growth of the Social Security program from both the expenditures and the receipts perspective. 
The growth of Social Security expenditures 
The Social Security program began paying benefits in 1940. In that year, Social Security outlays accounted for 0.3 percent of total 
budget outlays. In 1950, amendments were made to the program that liberalized eligibility for benefits and extended compulsory coverage 
to most nonfarm self-employed persons. In that year, Social Security outlays increased to 1.8 percent of total budget outlays. In 1956, dis-
ability benefits were added, and the age of entitlement was reduced to age 62 for women. Outlays increased to 7.8 percent of the budget. 
Medicare was added in 1965, and this raised the outlay percentage to 14.8 percent. Automatic wage and benefit indexing was introduced in 
1972 and modified substantially in 1977. By 1972, the outlay percentage had grown to 20.7 percent, and it increased to 25.5 percent in 1977. 
By 1985, this percentage exceeded 28 percent. A comparison of the percentage change in outlays in the federal budget from 1958-1986 is pre-
sented in Graph 1, which is taken from the Special Analysis Budget of the United States Government, 1986. The growth in domestic 
transfer payments (much of which can be attributed to Social Security) as a percentage of the budget is evident from this graph. 
In addition to its growth in absolute dollars, Social Security program spending has also increased significantly in terms of real 
(indexed) dollars. From 1962-1981, Social Security benefits grew at a real growth rate of 8.7 percent. Since 1981, program cuts and Social 
Security reforms have lowered the real growth rate to approximately 3.4 percent.14 
The growth of Social Security taxes 
The growth of Social Security taxes as a percent of total federal receipts has been dramatic since their imposition in 1937. In 1940, the 
first year of payments, Social Security taxes actually accounted for 27.3 percent of total tax receipts (by contrast, individual income taxes 
accounted for 13.6 percent of total tax receipts and corporate income taxes accounted for 18.3 percent). Expansion of the income tax system 
to help pay for World War II raised the individual income tax percentage to 45.0 percent in 1944 and the corporate income tax percentage to 
33.9 percent. This had the effect of lowering the Social Security percentage to 7.9 percent.15 Since that time, the individual income tax per-
centage has remained in the range of 40-45 percent of total tax receipts. Over the same period, there has been a gradual decline in the per-
centage raised by the corporate income tax and a steady rise in the percentage raised by Social Security taxes. 
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Since 1968, the percentage raised by Social Security taxes has exceeded that raised by corporate income taxes such that in 1985 Social 
Security taxes will raise more than four times the tax revenues raised through the corporate income tax. This change in the percentage of tax 
dollars raised by each tax revenue source can be seen in Graph 2, which is also taken from the Special Analysis Budget of the United States 
Government, 1986. 
One consequence of the increase in the Social Security tax has been to increase significantly the size and nature of the tax burden on low 
and middle income workers. As reported by the President's National Commission on Social Security Reform, Social Security taxes paid by 
the average worker (including the employer-paid portion) have increased 2011 percent between 1950 and 1980, as compared to a 594 percent 
increase in federal income taxes paid and a 490 percent increase in wages.16 The net result, as reported in the Special Analysis Budget of the 
United States Government, 1986, is that: 
As a result of the rapid rise in social insurance taxes (mainly social security) 
and the passage of legislation reducing or eliminating individual income 
taxes for many low- and moderate-income individuals and families, millions 
of Americans now pay significantly higher social insurance taxes than income 
taxes.17 
One might assume under a "pay-as-we-go" funding philosophy, that whenever Social Security beiefits are increased, there would be a 
commensurate increase in Social Security taxes to pay for the increased expenditures. Such has generally not been the case, at least not 
until the early 1970s. Benefit increases in the 1950s and 1960s were not accompanied by tax increases of the same magnitude. Instead, Con-
gress chose to draw down the reserves in the trust funds to make up part of the difference between receipts and outlays. Such actions 
ultimately led to an impending insolvency of the retirement trust fund in 1984. The immediate insolvency was prevented by allowing inter-
fund borrowing from the disability and hospital trust funds and by the enactment of tax increases coupled with the deferral of expenditures 
in the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act. 
The rise in Social Security taxes, the much publicized near insolvency of the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund, and record federal 
budget deficits have combined to focus attention once again on the size of the Social Security program and the premise on which it was foun-
ded. This last section will discuss short and long range concerns that have been voiced about the Social Security program as it prepares to 
begin its second 50 years of existence. 
GRAPH 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL SECTOR EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORY 1958-1986 
Distribution of Federal Sector Expenditures by Category 
Percent Percent 
Source: Special Analysis Budget of the United States Government, 1985, p. B-3. 
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GRAPH 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL SECTOR RECEIPTS BY CATEGORY 1958-1986 
Source: Special Analysis Budget of the Uni ted S ta tes Government , 1985, p . B - 6 . 
Concerns about the Social Security Program in 1986 and Beyond 
Despite the changes made in the Social Security program by the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act to alleviate the 
imbalance between revenues and expenditures (e.g., acceleration of tax increases, expansion of covered employment, increase in the retire-
ment age, deferral of cost of living adjustments), there still exist both short and long range concerns about both the financial health and the 
perceived fairness of the current Social Security system. In particular, concerns continue to be expressed about [1] the fragility of the 
financial solvency of the trust funds in the short run, [2] the cost to support the program in the long run, [3] the unequal treatment of 
spouses under the current system and [4] the degree to which a fair return on Social Security payments can be guaranteed to all par-
ticipants in the program. These four concerns will be discussed in this section of this report. 
The financial solvency of the trust funds in the short run 
Beginning in 1976 and continuing through 1983, the disbursements from the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Fund exceeded the income 
to the fund in each month. The trust fund balance was reduced from $39.9 billion at the beginning of 1976 to $9.1 billion at the end of 1983. If 
it were not for a loan of $17.5 billion from the disability and hospital trust funds, the retirement trust fund would not have been able to meet 
its obligations in 1983. 
The combination of accelerated tax increases, an improved economy, and lower inflation rates has resulted in a much improved picture 
for the OASI trust fund in the near future. According to the 1985 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of this fund, inflows into the fund 
during fiscal year 1984 exceeded outflows by $0.9 billion.18 The report stated that benefits could be paid "well into the next century, on the 
basis of all four sets of assumptions for which the estimates are shown. "1 9 In the short range (1985-1989), it is estimated that income to the 
fund will exceed outflows in each year. For the years 1985-2009, a surplus varying from 0.82 to 3.14 percent of taxable payroll is projected. 
However, the current balance in the trust fund is still precarious. The trustees note that the trust fund levels are estimated to remain low 
through 1987 and need to be carefully monitored.20 After 1987, it is projected that the trust fund's ability to withstand temporary economic 
downturns will improve steadily. 
The optimism over the financial status of the retirement trust fund, while generally acknowledged, is not universally shared. A recent 
economic study Published by the Committee for Economic Development (CED) expresses strong reservations about the validity of the 
economic assumptions used in preparing the forecasts for the retirement trust fund.21 The concern of the CED is that the range of 
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assumptions used are too narrow in light of past experience. In any case, it appears safe to speculate that an economic downturn of the 
magnitude experienced in 1981-1982 would once again threaten the financial solvency of the retirement trust fund if it occurred in the next 
several years. 
The financial solvency of the trust funds in the long run 
The 1985 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the retirement trust fund estimates that beginning after the year 2015, the trust 
fund will once again begin experiencing annual deficits between inflows and outflows. The average annual deficit under the trustees' 
"realistic" assumption (Alternative II-B) for the period 2035-2059 is projected to be 2.46 percent of taxable payroll for the retirement trust 
fund only. Under the "pessimistic" assumptions (Alternative HI), this annual deficit could average as high as 11.78 percent of taxable 
payroll. Translated, this means that the combined payroll tax paid by employees and employers would have to be increased by 11.78 per-
centage points in order to fund the benefit payments (this would raise the combined OASDI rate to 24.18 percent). When the OASDI cost is 
combined with the cost to support the hospital trust fund, the total payroll tax rate necessary to support the Social Security program during 
the period 2035-2059 is projected to be almost 25 percent using the "realistic" assumptions and could reach as high as 40 percent under the 
"pessimistic" assumptions. It should be pointed out that the "realistic" assumptions use an inflation rate of 4.0 percent and an unemploy-
ment rate of 6.0 percent, while the "pessimistic" assumptions use an inflation rate of 5.0 percent and an unemployment rate of 7.0 percent. 
Even using the "realistic" assumptions, a self-employed person would be required to "contribute" one quarter of his or her net self-
employment income to the Social Security program to keep it solvent under the current financing arrangement. 
The projected deficits in the Social Security trust funds over the long run are the result of projected structural changes in demography 
rather than projected economic performance. In particular, the ratio of beneficiaries to workers is projected to change dramatically due 
to [1] a rapid growth in the aged population (due to the retirement of the post-World War II babies), [2] improvements in mortality rates 
(average life expectancy is at an all time high of 74.6 years), and [3] a significant drop in birth rates (fewer workers are being added to the 
population). While the ratio of workers to beneficiaries was 16.5:1 in 1950, it is projected to decline to 2:1 in 203022 Under a "pay-as-you-go" 
funding arrangement, this means that each retiree's benefits will be dependent on the contributions of only two workers. 
The treatment of spouses under the present Social Security program 
In addition to the demographic changes that threaten the long run financial solvency of the Social Security program, there are also 
demographic changes that threaten the perceived (and actual) equity of the benefit structure. In particular, the 1970s began a period of 
rapid change in the composition of the U.S. workforce and the divorce rates between spouses. When the Social Security program was foun-
ded in 1935, the divorce rate was minimal and more than 80 percent of all households were supported by one working spouse. Today both of 
these statistics have changed dramatically. Over half (51 percent in 1982) of all married women are engaged in paid employment (49 per-
cent of the married mothers of pre-school children), and approximately half of all first marriages end in divorce (the average length of 
marriage is currently about 9.5 years).23 
The current Social Security dependency rules (see earlier discussion in this chapter) have not been changed to reflect the socio-
economic changes that have occurred since 1935. As a result, many second wage-earners in a marriage discover that they have paid in 
significant amounts of Social Security taxes on their lifetime earnings and still qualify for benefits based on their spouse's earnings record. 
A one wage-earner couple could receive identical retirement benefits as the two wage-earner couple and have paid significantly less in 
Social Security taxes. In addition, should one of the workers in a two wage-earner family die before reaching retirement, the surviving 
spouse would receive benefits based on the earnings record of only one of the marriage partners. The economic benefit of the retirement por-
tion of the Social Security contributions of one of the two partners will be lost to the family unit, except for a $255 death benefit. 
In addition to the bias against the two wage-earner couple, there also exists a bias against the spouse who gives up covered employment 
in order to raise a family. Under the current provision, a spouse must remain married for at least 10 years before he or she is entitled to retire-
ment benefits based on the earnings record of the other spouse. In light of the fact that the average marriage lasts only 9.5 years, it appears 
safe to assume that an increasing number of non-employed spouses are being left with no earnings record for a substantial period of time and 
no Social Security credits for the time spent supporting the ex-spouse during the marriage. Although most of these divorced persons even-
tually remarry or build up work records of their own, the current arrangement is still inequitable. 
Of even more concern to most policymakers is the financial condition of widows who have reached retirement age. A recent study under-
taken by the Social Security Administration revealed that retired widows had a median income that was 78 percent of that of retired non-
married men and 37 percent of that of retired couples. The cause for this discrepancy was not attributed to the structure of the current 
Social Security program, however. Rather, the low economic state of many widows was more closely related to the fact that these persons 
tended to have few other sources of income other than Social Security benefits.24 Such a finding reinforces the need to more broadly define 
retirement policy to include private savings and pension plans along with Social Security (see Chapter 3 of this Tax Policy Analysis State-
ment for a broader discussion of national retirement policy). 
A solution that has been proposed to mitigate the marriage inequities that can occur under the present system is the implementation of 
some form of earnings sharing among spouses. In its most basic form, earnings sharing can be defined as a plan in which "the combined ear-
nings of a husband and wife during the period of their marriage shall be divided equally and shared between them for social security benefit 
purposes."25 The premise behind the earnings sharing concept is that marriage should be viewed as an economic partnership in which 
assets (such as Social Security earnings credits) should be divided equally between the spouses. A "pure" earnings sharing plan would 
credit each spouse with half of the couple's total covered earnings for each year of marriage and replace the current benefit structure with 
one in which each spouse would have a separate earnings record for benefit computation purposes. In its report on earnings sharing, the 
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Social Security Administration estimated that about 64 percent of the male beneficiaries and 37 percent of the female beneficiaries who 
would be age 62 or older in 2030 would receive reduced benefits under a generic earnings sharing plan without any transition plan.26. 
The crucial issues that must be resolved if an earnings sharing concept is to be implemented are: [1] phasing in the plan for current 
workers and [2] determining the extent to which earnings are to be shared.27. Under any earnings sharing plan, there would have to be 
safeguards to insure that current workers who have participated in the system for a substantial number of years receive benefits that 
parallel what they would receive under the current law. In every case, it would appear that earnings sharing would have to be implemented 
on a prospective basis because of the near impossibility of reconstructing accurate earnings records for members of the current workforce 
who have been divorced, remarried, etc. 
The actuarial fairness of the current Social Security program 
The current Social Security benefit structure is weighted to provide the low income worker with a higher retirement income replace-
ment rate than the high income worker. Such a structure has been defended on the grounds that higher income workers have additional 
sources of retirement income, whereas lower income workers are likely to be more heavily dependent on Social Security as a means of sup-
port in retirement. It also reflects the fact that the primary emphasis in the Social Security system is on "social adequacy" (see the earlier 
discussion on the philosophy of Social Security). 
As a result of the current benefit structure, lower wage earners receive a "return" on their tax contributions that is much greater than 
would be justified under a strict actuarial computation. These windfall benefits are in reality a form of wealth transfer payments from the 
higher wage earner to the lower wage earner. Wealth transfer payments are most often justified as being appropriate in the Social Security 
program because they provide the elderly with transfer payments that are devoid of the stigma attached to direct welfare payments. 
The use of the Social Security program to fund transfer payments means that higher wage earners must accept a lower return on their 
Social Security contributions. Current retirees at all wage levels could, to date, expect to receive retirement benefits in excess of an 
"actuarially fair" benefit.28 As the Social Security tax burden increases, however, the promise of receiving an "actuarially fair" benefit is 
less likely to be fulfilled for many future retirees. This relationship of benefits to contributions is explored more fully in Chapter 2 of this Tax 
Policy Analysis statement. 
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APPENDIX 
COMPUTING THE PRIMARY INSURANCE AMOUNT USING THE WAGE-INDEXED METHOD 
The calculation of the primary insurance amount (PIA) using the wage-indexed method will be illustrated in this appendix. The wage-
indexed method was introduced in the 1977 Amendments to the Social Security Act and applies to beneficiaries reaching age 62 after 1978. 
Under this method, a worker's past wages are adjusted for changes in the average wage subject to Social Security taxation in order to restate 
the wages in more current terms. 
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) 
The first step in the computation is to compute a worker's average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The AIME is computed in the 
following manner: 
1. The worker's actual annual covered wages are listed for years beginning after 1950 or after age 21, whichever 
is later. 
2. The actual wages for the computation years up to and including the second year before the year in which the 
worker attains age 62, dies or becomes disabled (whichever is earlier) are indexed by multiplying the actual 
wage times the following ratio: 
average covered annual wage in the second year prior to 
age 62, death or disability 
average covered annual wage in the year indexed 
3. Covered wages not indexed are included at their actual amounts. 
4. The computation period consists of the years beginning after age 21 or 1950 (whichever is later) and extending 
up to the year in which the worker becomes 62, dies or becomes disabled. The five years of lowest (or no) indexed 
earnings are excluded, and years of earnings sifter age 61 may be substituted for years of lower indexed earnings 
included in the computation period. 
5. The AIME is then calculated by dividing the total indexed annual earnings in the computation period by the 
number of months in the computation period. 
Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) 
Once the worker's AIME is computed, the PIA is computed by applying three separate percentages to increments of the AIME. The 
dollar amounts of AIME at which the percentage changes are called "bend points." The percentage rates are 90%, 32%, and 15%. The bend 
points for 1985 are $230 and $1691. The PIA also is increased by the changes in the CPI that occur in the years beginning with age 62 and con-
tinuing through the last year worked. 
Example 
An example will be used to illustrate the operation of each of these computations. The PIA calculation will be made for a worker earning 
at the maximum covered wage who was born on February 1, 1920 and retires on January 1, 1985. The worker is assumed to begin work on 
January 1, 1942 and works through the end of 1984. 
Table 1A lists the worker's wages subject to Social Security taxation from 1942 through 1984. Table 2A presents the calculation of the 
worker's AIME. Notice that only the wages earned after 1950 enter the calculation. The average covered wage for 1980 (the second year 
before the worker turns 62) was $12,513.46. This factor is used to index the actual wages earned through 1980. The computation period 
extends from 1951-1981. The five lowest indexed wages in the period are eliminated, and the three actual wages earned in 1982, 1983, and 
1984 are substituted for three indexed years because they are higher amounts. This results in 8 years of indexed earnings being discarded. 
The total annual indexed wages for the remaining 26 years is $528,686.70. This amount is divided by 312 months (26 x 12), resulting in 
an AIME of $1694. The PIA is then computed as follows: 
90% x $ 230 = 207 plus 
32% x 1461 = 467.52 plus 
15% x 3 = 0.45 
for a total of $674.97. This amount is increased by the CPI increases for 1982 (7.4%), 1983 (3.5%), and 1984 (3.5%) for a total amount of 
$776.55. This is rounded down to $776.50. 
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TABLE 1A 
MAXIMUM COVERED WAGES FOR WORKER, 1942-1984 
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year 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
earnings 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,000.00 
3,600.00 
3,600.00 
3,600.00 
3,600.00 
4,200.00 
4,200.00 
4,200.00 
4,200.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
6,600.00 
6,600.00 
7,800.00 
7,800.00 
7,800.00 
7,800.00 
9,000.00 
10,800.00 
13,200.00 
14,100.00 
15,300.00 
16,500.00 
17,700.00 
22,900.00 
25,900.00 
29,700.00 
32,400.00 
35,700.00 
37,800.00 
TABLE 2A 
COMPUTATION OF AIME FOR MAXIMUM WAGE WORKER, 1942-1984 
Wage-Indexed Formula (1977 Act) 
year 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
earnings 
3,600.00 
3,600.00 
3,600.00 
3,600.00 
4,200.00 
4,200.00 
4,200.00 
4,200.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
4,800.00 
6,600.00 
6,600.00 
7,800.00 
7,800.00 
7,800.00 
7,800.00 
9,000.00 
10,800.00 
13,200.00 
14,100.00 
15,300.00 
16,500.00 
17,700.00 
22,900.00 
25,900.00 
29,700.00 
32,400.00 
35,700.00 
37,800.00 
earnings 
* $12,513.46 
45,048,460.00 
45,048,460.00 
45,048,460.00 
45,048,460.00 
52,556,530.00 
52,556,530.00 
52,556,530.00 
52,556,530.00 
60,064,610.00 
60,064,610.00 
60,064,610.00 
60,064,610.00 
60,064,610.00 
60,064,610.00 
60,064,610.00 
82,588,840.00 
82,588,840.00 
97,604,990.00 
97,604,990.00 
97,604,990.00 
97,604,990.00 
112,621,200.00 
135,145,400.00 
165,177,700.00 
176,439,800.00 
191,455,900.00 
206,472,100.00 
221,488,300.00 
286,558,300.00 
324,098,600.00 
indexed 
earnings 
16,093.56 
15,150.89 
14,349.20 
14,275.54 
15,919.28 
14,878.59 
14,431.79 
14,305.77 
15,577.73 
14,989.47 
14,697.37 
13,996.51 
13,661.48 
13,125.09 
12,892.94 
16,723.94 
15,841.52 
17,517.80 
16,560.73 
15,777.76 
15,022.90 
15,786.98 
17,828.83 
20,568.13 
20,442.76 
20,750.70 
21,112.88 
20,982.15 
24,962.69 
25,900.00 
29,700.00 
32,400.00 
35,700.00 
37,800.00 
high N 
years 
16,093.56 
15,150.89 
15,919.28 
14,878.59 
15,577.73 
14,989.47 
14,697.37 
16,723.94 
15,841.52 
17,517.80 
16,560.73 
15,777.76 
15,022.90 
15,786.98 
17,828.83 
20,568.13 
20,442.76 
20,750.70 
21,112.88 
20,982.15 
24,962.69 
25,900.00 
29,700.00 
32,400.00 
35,700.00 
37,800.00 
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An alternative approach to the present computation of Social Security benefits is to replace the existing stratified (three tiered) benefit 
formula with a uniform benefit schedule that is based on the total contributions of each individual to the retirement system. Total con­
tributions would include both the employee and the employer-paid contributions plus a real rate of return. Retirees would be given a choice 
of the following options at retirement: (1) a joint-and-survivor annuity, (2) a single life annuity, or (3) an annuity with a guaranteed 
refund feature. 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the benefit structure of the current Social Security program with the benefits that would be 
payable under an annuity approach. Such a comparison will illustrate the extent to which wealth transfers (welfare) exist under the current 
program and provide a point of reference in evaluating the effects of adopting an annuity approach. It should be pointed out that this 
analysis uses the currently scheduled tax rates in the computation of the worker's contribution to the retirement system. The appropriate 
tax rates to impose under an annuity approach would be determined by the level of benefits that is deemed necessary to provide 
beneficiaries with a determined minimum level of income. The current rates are used in this analysis solely as a measure of comparison of 
the current benefit structure with an annuity based benefit structure. 
Defining An Annuity Approach 
The model used to represent the annuity approach is presented in Exhibit 1. The components of each of the equations in the model and 
the necessary underlying assumptions are discussed in this section. Before this is done, however, an overview of the overall contents and 
intent of the model is presented. 
The objective of the model is to compute the annuity returns to groups of workers who have paid into Social Security under different 
assumptions about wage levels, family wage-earner compositions, working periods, and interest rates. The annuity returns computed take 
into account inflation indexing of the benefits and guaranteed rates of return, and thus differ from private market annuities in that 
respect. 
EXHIBIT 1 
ANNUITY COMPUTATION MODEL 
Source: Edmund Outslay and James E. Wheeler, "Separating the Annuity and Income Transfer Elements of Social Security," The 
Accounting Review, October 1982, p. 720. 
(2) 
(3) 
-26-
e e 
Ce = Σ wi(tai + stbi) π (1 + rk) 
i=22 k=i 
Ce=future value of contributions accumulated to date 
of entitlement of worker 
wi=worker's taxed wages in year i 
tai=tax rate assessed on worker in year i 
tbi=tax rate assesed on worker's employer in year i 
s=percentage of employer-paid tax rate shifted to 
the worker 
rk=compounding interest rate in year k 
e=year of entitlement to begin collecting benefits 
The initial annuity that can be purchased with Ce can b 
defined as either C/äx or C/äxy, where 
äx=cost of $1 of a single-life annuity-due=Nx/D65 
and 
Dx=vx1x 
vx=discount factor for some interest rate r 
1x=survival probability factor for age x 
and 
Nx=Nx+l+Dx,or the sum of Dx's from termination 
age (age 99) to entitlement age (age 65) 
or 
axy=cost of $1 of a joint-and-two-thirds-survivor 
annuity-due = 2/3äx + 2/3ä, - 1/3äxy ,where 
ax=single-life annuity-due for a male 
äy = single-life annuity-due for a female 
äxy=joint-life annuity-due for male and female, 
defined as Nxy/Dxy 
(1) 
The first equation (equation 1 in the model) calculates the fund amount that would be "credited'' to a worker upon retirement at age 65 
(the Social Security system would presumably still operate on a "pay-as-you-go" basis). This credited amount will be dependent upon the 
level of the worker's wages (wi) subject to the Social Security tax, the rate of tax (ti), and the compound interest rate (rk). Survival pro-
babilities are not included in this formula because the focus is on those participants who reach retirement (entitlement) age. 
The second two equations in the model (equations 2 and 3), are used to compute the cost of a $1 indexed (price-level-adjusted) annuity-
due at age 65 for either a single-life annuity (equation 2) or a joint-and-two-thirds survivor annuity (equation 3). The joint-and-two-thirds 
survivor annuity is equivalent to the dependent's provisions of the current Social Security program in which spouses may jointly receive 150 
percent of the benefit of the spouse with the larger benefit while both are alive, with the survivor receiving 100 percent of the benefit after one 
of the spouses dies. 
Equations 2 and 3 are referred to in actuarial science as "commutationfunctions."1 Each of the terms in these equations is in standard 
actuarial notation. Note that survival probabilities (lx) are factors in the annuity equations because the annuities are paid over the remain-
ing lives of the beneficiaries, as are Social Security benefits. An assumption about a discounting factor (vx) is also required in the 
computation. 
Once the cost of $1 of either annuity-due is calculated, the annual annuity is computed by dividing the fund available to "purchase" 
the annuity at age 65 (ce) by the cost of purchasing a $1 annuity-due. This annuity can then be compared with the Social Security "annuity" 
that would be payable under the current law given the corresponding wage history for each worker examined. Differences between the two 
computations provide a measurement of the extent to which current benefits exceed (fall short of) actuarially earned benefits based on life-
time contributions. 
The remainder of this section discusses the components of each of the equations of the annuity model. 
Computing the Future Value of Taxes Paid 
Workers of different wage and family profiles were formed for two working life time periods: 1942-1984 and 1985-2027. These groups 
will allow for comparisons between persons who are retiring in 1985 with persons who are beginning work in 1985. For each time period, three 
sets of wage histories were analyzed. These wage histories represent workers earning the 1) Federal minimum wage, 2) average wage sub-
ject to Social Security taxation, and 3) maximum wage subject to Social Security taxation (the wage and contribution base). Two wage-
earner couples were formed using the various combinations of maximum, average and minimum wage levels. For years before 1986, the 
actual wage at each level was used in the computation. For years after 1985, the three levels were projected using the Economic Assumptions 
II-B contained in the 1985 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Funds.2 The Economic Assumptions 
II-B are often referred to as the "realistic" assumptions in the Annual Report (as opposed to the "optimistic" and "pessimistic" 
assumptions). Under Economic Assumption II-B, the average earnings in covered employment are projected to level off at an increase of 
5.5 percent per year beginning in the year 2010. The real growth in average earnings (nominal growth less the increase in the CPI) is assumed 
to be 1.5 percent. 
The rate of tax paid by the worker (as scheduled under current law) was restricted to only that portion of the Social Security tax that is 
designated for funding retirement benefits (i.e., the old-age and survivorship portion, hereafter referred to as OASI). As a simplifying 
assumption, the OASI taxes were treated as paid at the beginning of the year in one lump sum payment. This assumption will slightly 
overstate the total future value of the "accumulated" payments at age 65. 
The amount of contributions credited to the worker was calculated using just the amount paid by the worker and by using the combined 
amount paid by the worker and his or her employer. 
Finally, the contributions were compounded using both a one percent and a three percent real rate-of-return assumption. For each year 
in which the worker paid taxes, the contributions were compounded by an interest rate composed of the actual or projected Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) rate for that year plus one or three percent. The CPI projections for 1985 and beyond were based on Economic Assumption II-B 
used in the 1985 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old-Age and Survivors Trust Funds. Under Economic Assumption II-B, the 
CPI rate is projected to level off at an annual increase of 4 percent by the year 1991. A one percent real rate of return would be represented by 
an interest rate of 5 percent and a three percent real rate of return would be represented by an interest rate of 7 percent. 
Computing the Cost of An Annuity-Due 
The primary considerations in the computation of the cost of a $1 annuity-due, either single-life or joint-and-two-thirds survivor, are 
the interest factor (vx) and the mortality factor (lx). The interest factor used reflected either a one percent or a three percent real rate of 
return, corresponding to the real rate of return used to compute the "fund" available to purchase the annuity in Equation 1 of the model. 
Because the annuity computed was an inflation-adjusted annuity (to make it comparable to the social security benefit), the CPI adjust-
ment was omitted from vx (i.e., the interest rate used was either 1 percent or 3 percent). The resulting annuity is therefore initially smaller 
than an annuity that is a level benefit per year. Unisex mortality rates were used in making the computations and were obtained from the 
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) .3 These rates tend to be slightly above the national average because of the characteris-
tics of TIAA's annuitants. 
The cost of a $1 single-life indexed annuity-due under a 1 percent real rate of return assumption was computed to be $18.44. The cost of 
a joint-and-two-thirds survivor option under the same interest rate assumption was computed to be $19.83. The cost of a $1 single-life 
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indexed annuity-due under a 3 percent real rate of return assumption was computed to be $15.03, with the corresponding joint-and-two-
thirds survivor annuity-due costing $16.00. 
A Comparison of Social Security Benefits with An Annuity Approach 
The focus of the analysis in this chapter is on comparing the Social Security benefits workers can expect to receive under the current 
system with benefits computed using the annuity formulas just discussed. The obvious difference between the two calculations will stem 
from the fact that under the current system, benefits are a function of lifetime wages subject to Social Security taxation while the annuity is 
a function of lifetime taxes paid. 
In this study, the retirement and dependent's benefits for each worker or family unit were computed using the benefit (PIA) computa-
tion software program developed and supplied by the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration.4 This program is not the 
official program used to compute actual benefits, but it does compute the benefits to be received under different wage levels. As was the case 
with the annuity computations, the economic assumptions needed to project changes in the CPI and the average wages subject to the Social 
Security tax were based on the 1985 Trustees' Economic Assumptions II-B. 
The retirement benefits for the worker were computed under the assumption that the worker retired at age 65. For workers in the wage 
Period 1985-2027 the "normal" retirement age under the current law would be age 67. If benefits were elected at age 65, the benefit amount 
would be reduced by an actuarial factor of 86.67 percent. In this study, the benefits used for comparison were not reduced by the actuarial 
factor. In the case of family units, it was assumed the spouses were the same age and applied for benefits at the same time. 
In order to be consistent with the Social Security taxes paid assumption, the Social Security benefit was assumed to be paid at the 
beginning of each year in one lump-sum payment (annuity-due) rather than as a monthly payment. 
Results and Analysis 
The results of the comparisons between the Social Security benefit to be received and the corresponding annuity that the tax con-
tributions could "purchase'' are presented in Tables 1-4. Tables 1 and 2 portray the results for single wage earners and married couples with 
one and two wage earners of various income levels who began working in 1942 and are retiring in 1985. Table 1 presents the results under a 
one percent real rate of return assumption and Table 2 presents the results under a three percent real rate of return assumption. Tables 3 and 
4 repeat the same comparisons for single and married couple wage earners who begin working in 1985 and will retire in the year 2028. 
Column 1 of each table lists the worker status and wage levels of each worker(s). The second column lists the "fund" that would be 
credited to the worker(s) upon retirement if the Social Security taxes paid were deemed to accumulate at the prescribed real rate of interest. 
This amount takes into account the Social Security taxes paid by both the worker and the worker's employer. If just the worker's con-
tributions were taken into account, the amount would be half of the listed amount. It must be stressed again that this analysis uses the 
currently scheduled OASI tax rates in making this computation. 
TABLE 1 
OASI AND ANNUITY BENEFIT COMPUTATIONS 
FOR WORKERS RETIRING IN 1985 
1% REAL RATE OF RETURN ASSUMPTION 
WORKER STATUS 
& WAGE LEVELS 
(1) 
SINGLE 
Min. Wage 
Avg. Wage 
Max. Wage 
MARRIED 
Min/$0 
Avg/$0 
Max/$0 
Min/Min 
Min/Avg 
Min/Max 
Avg/Avg 
Avg/Max 
Max/Max 
FUTURE VALUE 
OF TAXES PAID 
(2) 
$ 22,521.44 
46,896.84 
71,704.84 
$ 22,521.44 
46,869.84 
71,704.84 
45,042.88 
69,391.28 
94,226.28 
93,739.68 
118,574.68 
143,409.68 
OASI 
BENEFIT 
(3) 
$ 4,434.00 
6,580.80 
8,606.40 
$ 6,651.00 
9,871.20 
12,909.60 
8,868.00 
11,014.80 
13,040.40 
13,161.60 
15,187.20 
17,212.80 
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ANNUITY 
BENEFIT 
(4) 
$ 1,221.34 
2,541.75 
3,888.55 
$1,135.73 
2,323.20 
3,615.98 
2,271.45 
3,499.31 
4,751.70 
4,727.16 
5,979.56 
7,231.96 
OASI/ANNUITY 
RATIO 
(5) 
3.63 ( 7.26) 
2.59 ( 5.18) 
2.21 ( 4.43) 
5.86 (11.71) 
4.25 ( 8.50) 
3.57 ( 7.14) 
3.90 ( 7.81) 
3.15 ( 6.30) 
2.74 ( 5.49) 
2.78 ( 5.56) 
2.54 ( 5.08) 
2.38 ( 4.76) 
TABLE 3 
OASI AND ANNUITY BENEFIT COMPUTATIONS 
FOR WORKERS BEGINNING WORK IN 1985 
1% REAL RATE OF RETURN ASSUMPTION 
WORKER STATUS 
& WAGE LEVELS 
(1) 
SINGLE 
Min. Wage 
Avg. Wage 
Max. Wage 
MARRIED 
Min/$0 
Avg/$0 
Max/$0 
Min/Min 
Min/Avg 
Min/Max 
Avg/Avg 
Avg/Max 
Max/Max 
FUTURE VALUE 
OF TAXES PAID 
(2) 
$ 286,666.12 
731,269.50 
1,683,579.64 
$ 286,666.12 
731,269.50 
1,683,579.64 
573,332.24 
1,017,935.60 
1,970,245.70 
1,462,539.00 
2,414,849.10 
3,367,159.20 
OASI 
BENEFIT 
(3) 
$ 37,843.20 
66,835.20 
105,128.40 
$ 56,764.80 
100,252.80 
157,692.60 
75,686.40 
104,678.40 
157,692.15 
133,670.40 
171,963.60 
210,256.80 
ANNUITY 
BENEFIT 
(4) 
$ 15,545.89 
39,656.70 
91,300.41 
$ 14,456.18 
36,876.93 
84,900.63 
28,912.37 
51,333.11 
99,356.82 
73,753.86 
121,777.56 
169,801.27 
OASI/ANNUITY 
RATIO 
(5) 
2.43 
1.69 
1.15 
3.93 
2.72 
1.86 
2.62 
2.04 
1.59 
1.81 
1.41 
1.24 
(4.87) 
(3.37) 
(2.30) 
(7.85) 
(5.44) 
(3.71) 
(5.24) 
(4.08) 
(3.17) 
(3.62) 
(2.82) 
(2.48) 
TABLE 2 
OASI AND ANNUITY BENEFIT COMPUTATIONS 
FOR WORKERS RETIRING IN 1985 
3% REAL RATE OF RETURN ASSUMPTION 
WORKER STATUS 
& WAGE LEVELS 
(1) 
SINGLE 
Min. Wage 
Avg. Wage 
Max. Wage 
MARRIED 
Min/$0 
Avg/$0 
Max/$0 
Min/Min 
Min/Avg 
Min/Max 
Avg/Avg 
Avg/Max 
Max/Max 
FUTURE VALUE 
OF TAXES PAID 
(2) 
$ 30,777.34 
64,353.20 
93,433.18 
$ 30,777.34 
64,353.20 
93,433.18 
61,554.68 
95,130.54 
124,210.52 
128,706.40 
157,786.38 
186,866.36 
OASI 
BENEFIT 
(3) 
$ 4,434.00 
6,580.80 
8,606.40 
$ 6,651.00 
9,871.20 
12,909.60 
8,868.00 
11,014.80 
13,040.40 
13,161.60 
15,187.20 
17,212.80 
ANNUITY 
BENEFIT 
(4) 
$ 2,047.73 
4,281.65 
6,216.45 
$1,923.58 
4,022.08 
5,839.57 
3,847.17 
5,945.66 
7,763.16 
8,044.15 
9,861.65 
11,679.15 
OASI/ANNUITY 
RATIO 
(5) 
2.16 
1.54 
1.38 
3.46 
2.45 
2.21 
2.31 
1.85 
1.68 
1.64 
1.54 
1.47 
(4.33) 
(3.07) 
(2.77) 
(6.92) 
(4.91) 
(4.42) 
(4.61) 
(3.71) 
(3.36) 
(3.27) 
(3,08) 
(2.95) 
-29-
TABLE 4 
OASI AND ANNUITY BENEFIT COMPUTATIONS 
FOR WORKERS BEGINNING WORK IN 1985 
3% REAL RATE OF RETURN ASSUMPTION 
WORKER STATUS FUTURE VALUE OASI ANNUITY OASI/ANNUITY 
& WAGE LEVELS OF TAXES PAID BENEFIT BENEFIT RATIO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SINGLE 
Min. Wage 
Avg. Wage 
Max. Wage 
MARRIED 
Min/$0 
Avg/$0 
Max/$0 
Min/Min 
Min/Avg 
Min/Max 
Avg/Avg 
Avg/Max 
Max/Max 
$ 443,859.26 
1,122,481.80 
2,529,411.00 
$ 443,859.26 
1,122,481.80 
2,529,411.00 
887,718.52 
1,566,341.10 
2,973,270.30 
2,244,963.60 
3,651,892.80 
5,058,822.00 
$ 37,843.20 
66,835.20 
105,128.40 
$ 56,764.80 
100,252.80 
157,692.60 
75,686.40 
104,678.40 
157,692.15 
133,670.40 
171,963.60 
210,256.80 
$ 29,531.55 
74,682.76 
168,290.82 
$ 27,741.20 
70,155.12 
158,088.19 
55,482.40 
97,896.32 
185,829.39 
140,310.23 
228,243.30 
316,176.38 
1.28 
0.89* 
0.62* 
2.05 
1.43 
1.00 
1.36 
1.07 
0.85* 
0.95* 
0.75* 
0.66* 
(2.56) 
(1.79) 
(1.25) 
(4.09) 
(2.86) 
(1.99) 
(2.73) 
(2.14) 
(1.70) 
(1.91) 
(1.51) 
(1.33) 
Notes to the Preceding Tables 
a. The wages for married couples are the various combinations of the three wage levels computed for single 
workers (i.e., Min/Min represents a two wage-earner couple who both earned at the minimum wage level). 
b. The future value of taxes paid includes both the employer and the employee paid amounts. 
c. The annuity benefit is computed as a single life for single workers and a joint and two-thirds survivor for married 
workers. 
d. The OASI/Annuity benefit ratio is computed for both the combined employer and employee contribution and 
the employee contribution alone (in parentheses). 
e. The OASI benefit for married retirees is computed using the greater of the actual combined benefits or 150% of 
the benefit of the spouse with the greater earnings for purposes of the dependency benefit. 
f. Ratios of less than 1.00 (marked with an *) indicate situations in which the Social Security benefit is less than 
the annuity that could be "purchased" with the "fund" of contributions accumulated at the date of retirement. 
Column 3 provides the retirement benefit that the workers would be entitled to given their respective wage histories. Column 4 then 
lists the price-level adjusted annuity benefit that could be "purchased" with the "fund" from column 2. Finally, the retirement benefit in 
column 3 is divided by the annuity benefit from column 4, with the resulting ratio presented in column 5. The first ratio presented is com-
puted using the total amount from column 2 (the combined taxes paid by the worker and the worker's employer). The second ratio takes into 
account only the funds contributed by the worker. This ratio measures the extent to which the Social Security benefit exceeds or falls short 
of the annuity benefit. Ratios in excess of 1.00 indicate situations were the Social Security benefit contains a transfer welfare payment. 
It is apparent from Tables 1 and 2 that workers of all income levels and marital statuses who are retiring in 1985 can expect to receive an 
income transfer payment through the Social Security system under either a 1 or 3 percent real rate of return assumption. As one would 
expect given the skewness in the benefit structure toward low income wage earners, the transfer element is greatest in payments to workers 
at the minimum wage and to couples in which only one wage earner is present (due to the dependency provision). Wage earners at the max-
imum covered wage receive the smallest element of transfer payment as a percentage of the total payment. In nominal dollars, however, the 
maximum wage earners receive a transfer payment that exceeds the transfer payment received by low wage earners (e.g., the transfer pay-
ment made to a single wage earner at the minimum wage assuming a 1 percent real rate of return is $3,212.66, whereas the transfer payment 
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made to a single wage earier at the maximum covered wage is $4,717.85). It is also apparent from Tables 1 and 2 that the real rate of return 
assumption has a significant effect on the ratios of Social Security benefit to annuity. Although the Social Security benefit is not affected by 
the assumption changes, the annuity benefit is dramatically affected. The ratios under a 3 percent real rate of return assumption are 60 - 70 
percent of the ratios under a 1 percent real rate of return. 
For workers who are beginning work in 1985 (at age 22), the "returns" from the Social Security system are much less generous than 
those received by workers who are retiring in 1985. Much of this is due to the fact that the Social Security tax burden will be much greater on 
beginning workers during their entire working lives than was the case for workers who spent the majority of their working lives in the 1940's 
through the 1960's. Workers who expect to retire in 2028 will still receive a transfer payment under a 1 percent real rate of return. However, 
single wage earners at the average and maximum wage levels, and married two wage-earner couples who have at least one spouse at either 
the average or maximum wage levels can expect to start "subsidizing" the Social Security system under a three percent real rate of return. 
For example, a two wage earner couple where each spouse earns the maximum covered wage can expect to receive a Social Security benefit 
that is only 66 percent of what their tax contributions could "purchase" in a price-level adjusted annuity. If their employers' contributions 
are ignored, there would be a transfer payment to the couple. 
It should also be reiterated in this discussion of benefit ratios that the actuarial reduction factor for persons retiring before age 67 has 
been ignored for the analysis of workers retiring in 2028. If the actuarial reduction factor of 86.67 percent was applied to the Social Security 
benefit (as would be the case under current law), the OASI/Annuity ratio would decline even further for the 2028 retirees. For a two wage ear-
ner married couple, the ratio would decline from 66 percent to 58 percent under a 3 percent real rate of return assumption. 
The bias in the current benefit structure in favor of single wage earier families is also evident from the tables. The effect of the depen-
dency provision in the current law can be seen by comparing the taxes paid and the benefits received by single wage earner couples to the 
corresponding amounts paid and received by two wage earner couples. A single wage earner couple where the working spouse earns at the 
average covered wage can expect to receive an OASI benefit of $100,252.80 when they retire in 2028. A two wage earner couple where both 
spouses earn at the average covered wage can expect to receive an OASI benefit of $133,670.40 (or 33 percent more than the one wage earner 
couple). The total Social Security taxes paid by the two wage earner couple would be twice that paid by the one wage earner couple, 
however. 
Other Approaches to the "Money's Worth" Question 
There are other ways in which to address the issue as to whether the Social Security program provides its participants with a "good 
deal." In the most frequent case, the "expected future value" of the participant's tax payments are compared to the "expected present 
value" of the participant's Social Security benefits.5 A participant is deemed to receive his or her "money's worth" from Social Security if 
the present value of the expected benefits is at least equal to the future value of the expected tax payments. 
This approach differs from the annuity approach presented in this analysis in that mortality considerations are taken into account in 
computing the future value of the tax payments. The annuity analysis assumed the worker reached the age of 65. By applying mortality 
rates to the tax payments, one can calculate the expected "well-offness" of the participant at the beginning of his or her entrance into the 
system. There is much validity to this approach, and readers are advised to investigate those studies as well. The annuity approach was 
chosen for this study because it more clearly delineates the "earned" from the "unearned" portions of the current Social Security benefit 
provisions. It also illustrates the differences that could occur in the distribution of retirement benefits from the Social Security trust funds if 
an annuity approach was adopted. Although lower wage earners would receive less in direct payments from the Social Security trust funds, 
it should not be assumed that their total payments would be less under an annuity plan. If additional payments were deemed necessary to 
bring these persons to a pre-determined level of household income, such payments could be forthcoming from general revenues, not the 
Social Security trust funds. 
Caveats and Implications 
Studies such as this, which project wage streams and interest rates into the future, are subject to assumptions that may or may not 
prove to be accurate. The assumption of interest rates was shown to have a significant effect on the results in the previous study. However, 
given that the same assumptions are used to compute both the annuity and the OASI benefit, comparisons of the relative magnitude of the 
two amounts do provide a valid framework for evaluating the effects of adopting an annuity approach. To this point, beneficiaries who reach 
retirement age can expect to receive a retirement benefit that is well in excess of the benefit that would be paid if actuarially determined. 
This phenomenon is not expected to continue in the future for all workers. Should inflation increase in the future relative to wage growth or 
should taxes have to be increased in the future (as they will under the present structure), high and average wage earners will receive a retire-
ment benefit that is even futher diminished when compared to an actuarially determined amount. 
This study makes no recommendation as to what should be the level of taxes paid or what should be a target retirement figure. Com-
parisons are made using the legislatively scheduled tax rates. If an annuity approach were to be adopted, it would be incumbant upon policy 
makers to decide on an appropriate replacement rate target for the retirement benefits provided through the Social Security system. Tables 
5 and 6 provide an analysis of the current replacement rates that are produced by the Social Security system for the same groups of workers 
that were previously discussed. It is apparent from these two tables that lower wage earners and single wage earner families have much 
higher replacement rates than higher wage earner families. In the extremes, the single wage earner family at the minimum wage will have 
88.5 to 95.5 percent of their final year's pre-retirement wages replaced by their Social Security benefits. On the other hand, the single max-
imum wage earner will have only 22.8 to 27.5 percent of his or her final year's pre-retirement wage replaced by the Social Security benefit. 
This again reflects the fact that the benefit structure is heavily weighted toward the lower wage earner. 
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Regardless of whether benefits were to be lowered, it will be important to educate workers on the role of the Social Security program in 
the total retirement scheme (along with private savings and employer provided pensions). The next chapter puts the current relationship of 
Social Security to the other forms of retirement income in perspective. 
TABLE 5 
CURRENT SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF PRE-RETIREMENT INCOME 
FOR WORKERS RETIRING IN 1985 
OASI AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF PRE-RETIREMENT WAGE 
WORKER STATUS 
& WAGE LEVELS 
(1) 
SINGLE 
Min. Wage 
Avg. Wage 
Max. Wage 
MARRIED 
Min/$0 
Avg/$0 
Max/$0 
Min/Min 
Min/Avg 
Min/Max 
Avg/Avg 
Avg/Max 
Max/Max 
PRE-RETIREMENT 
WAGE* 
(2) 
$ 6,968.00 
16,135.07 
37,800.00 
6,968.00 
16,135.07 
37,800.00 
13,969.00 
23,103.07 
44,768.00 
32,270.14 
53,935.07 
75,600.00 
OASI 
BENEFIT 
(3) 
$ 4,434.00 
6,580.80 
8,606.40 
$ 6,651.00 
9,871.20 
12,909.60 
8,868.00 
11,014.80 
13,040.40 
13,161.60 
15,187.20 
17,212.80 
(4) 
63.6 
40.8 
22.8 
95.5 
61.2 
34.2 
63.6 
47.7 
29.1 
40.8 
28.2 
22.8 
*The amount in this column is the wage(s) earned by the worker(s) in the year before retirement (i.e., the wage earned at age 64). 
TABLE 6 
CURRENT SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AS A PERCENTAGE OF PRE-RETIREMENT INCOME 
FOR WORKERS BEGINNING WORK IN 1985 
WORKER STATUS PRE-RETIREMENT OASI OASI AS A PERCENTAGE 
& WAGE LEVELS WAGE* BENEFIT OF PRE-RETIREMENT WAGE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SINGLE 
Min. Wage $ 64,106.66 $ 37,843.20 59.0 
Avg. Wage 162,357.20 66,835.20 41.2 
Max. Wage 382,200.00 105,128.40 27.5 
MARRIED 
Min/$0 64,106.66 $ 56,764.80 88.5 
Avg/$0 162,357.20 100,252.80 61.7 
Max/$0 382,200.00 157,692.60 41.3 
Min/Min 128,213.32 75,686.40 59.0 
Min/Avg 226,463.86 104,678.40 46.2 
Min/Max 446,306.66 157,692.15 35.3 
Avg/Avg 324,714.40 133,670.40 41.2 
Avg/Max 544,557.20 171,963.60 31.6 
Max/Max 764,400.00 210,256.80 27.5 
*The amount in this column is the wage(s) earned by the worker(s) in the year before retirement (i.e., the wage earned at age 64). 
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The "Three Legged Stool" 
The components of retirement income policy in the United States have often been referred to as comprising a "three legged stool.'' The 
three legs of this stool consist of government payments (most notably Social Security), employee pension plans, and private savings. 
Occasionally, a fourth leg consisting of earned income (wages) is added to the stool. 
Each of these components of retirement income is important to consider in the formulation of a retirement income policy. Frequently, 
the source and amount of income from one component will have an effect on the amount of income received from another component (e.g., 
earned income may reduce the amount of Social Security benefits received under the retirement test, or the amount of Social Security 
benefit received may reduce the amount of pension benefit received if the plan is integrated with Social Security). Government policies 
toward the components of retirement income often fail to take into consideration the impact of legislation on the other components of retire-
ment income. In addition, tax policies toward each component are inconsistent with each other. This chapter briefly describes the role of 
each component of retirement income, especially with regard to its relationship with the Social Security system. Special emphasis is given 
to the tax policies that affect each component and how they might be made more consistent. 
Social Security 
The Social Security Program was signed into law in 1935 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The call for a national income security 
program was given a sense of urgency due to the economic catastrophe that befell millions of Americans in the Great Depression. As 
originally envisioned, Social Security was designed to provide a basic floor of protection for workers who suffered a loss of wage income due 
to death, disability, or retirement. Subsequent to its enactment, and prior to the payment of any benefits, the Social Security program was 
modified to include the spouses and dependents of workers in its coverage.1 Since its implementation, the program has been modified many 
times, with the most frequent changes being to liberalize benefits and expand the classes of workers covered by the system. Today, more 
than 90 percent of the working population is subject to Social Security taxation. 
Employee Pension Plans 
The first noncontributory company provided pension plan was established in the United States by the American Express Company in 
1875.2 However, the growth in employee pension plans did not become significant until the 1940s and 1950s. This period after World War II 
saw an increase in corporate profits and a significant increase in corporate tax rates, thus creating incentives for companies to "shelter" 
some of their profits by investing in company pension plans. In addition, the adequacy of Social Security benefits declined during this 
period and organized labor exerted pressure on companies to include an employee pension plan as part of their fringe benefit packages.3 
Finally, companies began to view pension plans as one part of a broader social responsibility to their employees.4 
Employee pension plans in the United States increased from approximately 15 percent of the nonagricultural workforce in 1940 to 
approximately 41 percent in 1960. However, since 1960, the participation level has grown at a much slower rate so that, by 1983, approx-
imately 48.5 percent of the nonagricultural workforce is covered by a plan.5 There are those who claim that such figures are significantly 
understated because they include many young people who have few years in the workforce and part timers or low paid workers in small 
businesses.6 These persons contend that the more realistic figure to use approaches 70 percent of the full-time American workers age 25 and 
older. Statistics provided in Table 1 by the Joint Committee on Taxation tend to support that argument. According to the table, the percentage 
of workers who are covered by employer-provided pension plans exceeds 75 percent for workers earning $20,000 and above. For workers earn-
ing less than $5,000, the percentage drops to 8.8 percent. 
In the previous decade there has been significant government legislation of pension plans. Beginning with the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 and continuing through the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, the government has attempted to 
safeguard the rights of employees from discriminatory plans that would favor higher paid employees. Such safeguards have often been 
attained with a high price of complexity, however. 
Private Savings 
Tax incentives to encourage private savings through the use of tax deferred savings accounts (i.e., Individual Retirement Accounts, or 
IRAs) were first introduced in ERISA in 1974. These savings accounts were available only to persons who were not covered by an employer-
provided pension plan. In the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, these plans were extended to all employees, regardless of 
whether they were covered by an employer-provided plan. In addition, the amount that could be sheltered from current taxation was 
expanded, as was the amount that could be invested in the retirement account of a spouse who had no earned income for the year. As one 
might expect, the greatest participation rates in IRAs come from middle and upper-income taxpayers. For 1983, over 66 percent of the IRA 
contributions were made by taxpayers with adjusted gross income over $30,000.7 Approximately 10.4 million taxpayers with adjusted gross 
income of under $50,000 made a contribution to an IRA in 1983.8 A more complete description of the contributions made to IRAs by tax-
payers of various income classes is contained in Table 2, taken from the Joint Taxation Committee. 
Earned Income 
As workers have begun to retire at earlier ages, the size and importance of earned income as a source of income for the aged has declined. 
One cause of this has been the trend toward early retirement by today's workers. In a recent study published by the Government Accounting 
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TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL NONAGRICULTURAL WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS 
WITH EMPLOYER PENSION PLANS, 1983 
Wage and salary class 
Total wage 
and salary 
workers 
(thousands) 
Workers with employer-
provided pension plan 
Number 
(thousands) 
Percent of 
workers 
Less than $5,000 17,766 1,568 8.8 
$5,000-$10,000 16,961 4,908 28.9 
$10,000-$20,000 29,926 17,405 58.2 
$20,000-$30,000 16,103 12,216 75.9 
$30,000-$50,000 8,544 6,672 78.1 
Over $50,000 2,088 1,529 73.2 
Total 91,388 44,298 48.5 
Source: Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury and 1984 Current Population 
Survey (reported data at 1983 levels). 
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions and Deferred Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 6. 
Office (GAO), it was estimated that approximately 50 percent of the workers collecting a pension in 1983 were age 62 or younger.9 By age 65, 
this percentage had increased to 60 percent. Contributing factors to this trend toward early retirement must undoubtedly include the 
increase in benefits provided by the Social Security program starting in the 1970s, coupled with the built-in disincentives that the program 
has against earning wages while collecting such benefits (i.e., the retirement test discussed in detail in Chapter I). 
TABLE 2 
NUMBER OF RETURNS AND AMOUNT OF PAYMENT TO IRAs 
DISTRIBUTED BY ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME CLASS, 1983 
Adjusted gross 
income class 
Num-
ber of 
eligi-
ble 
re-
turns 1 
Num-
ber 
re-
turns 
Returns 
As a 
% of 
eligi-
ble 
re-
turns 
Per-
cent 
distri-
bution 
Amount of payment 
Total 
amount 
Per-
cent 
distri-
bution 
Aver-
age 
amount 
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions and Deferred Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5, 1985, p. 8. 
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10 27,992 645 2.30 4.70 1,024 3.17 1,588 
10-20 21,297 2,010 9.44 14.65 3,648 11.28 1,815 
20-30 14,781 2,945 19.92 21.46 6,028 18.63 2,047 
30-40 9,814 2,860 29.14 20.84 6,804 21.03 2,379 
40-50 4,778 2,140 44.79 15.60 5,638 17.43 2,635 
50-100 3,979 2,558 64.29 18.64 7,536 23.30 2,946 
100-200 523 431 82.41 3.14 1,292 3.99 2,998 
200 or more.. 164 130 79.27 .95 377 1.17 2,900 
Total 83,326 13,721 16.47 100.00 32,348 100.00 2,358 
1
 Eligible returns are returns with wage and salary income. 
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Advanced Data, 1983. 
(Thousands of 
dollars) 
(Millions of 
dollars) 
(Thou-
sands) 
(Thou-
sands) 
(Per-
cent) 
(Per-
cent) 
(Per-
cent) (Dol-lars) 
The Role of Each Component of Retirement Income 
One of the difficult issues that must be resolved in the debate over a national income policy is the role of each component of retirement 
income in providing economic security to the elderly. The sources of income for taxpayers who were age 65 and older in 1983 are detailed in 
Table 3. As one might expect, Social Security benefits comprise the single largest source of income to all taxpayers who are age 65 and older. 
The percentage of total income that Social Security provides decreases as income increases. For taxpayers with less than $10,000 of adjus-
ted gross income, Social Security provided 55 percent of the total amount. For taxpayers in the $50,000 to $75,000 range, Social Security 
provided only 9 percent of the total amount. It should be pointed out that over two-thirds of the taxpayers examined in Table 3 had total 
adjusted incomes of less than $10,000. The heavy reliance on Social Security benefits is particularly acute among elderly unmarried 
women. The Social Security Administration reports that in 1982, 20 percent of unmarried beneficiary women age 65 and over received 100 
percent of their income from Social Security.10 This compares to 17 percent for unmarried beneficiary men and 9 percent of beneficiary 
married couples. 
Although Social Security was intended to provide a floor of basic protection when it was enacted in 1935, it is obvious that many retirees 
view Social Security as their predominant, and frequently their sole, means of retirement support. Despite the significant increases in 
Social Security benefits in the past 20 years, a common complaint often registered by beneficiaries about Social Security is that it does not 
provide enough money to live on. If Social Security is to serve as a floor of basic protection, then it becomes important to encourage and 
strengthen the other legs of the retirement stool, employer-provided pensions and individual savings. 
While individual savings decisions often reflect an individual's propensity to consume goods and services now or in the future, the role 
of employer-provided pensions is often viewed as a necessary supplement to Social Security to provide retirees with a retirement level that 
is somewhat better than a subsistence level. In many cases, however, employer-provided pension plans are integrated with Social Security 
such that lower income employees receive a decreased amount of pension relative to higher income persons because the Social Security 
benefit structure is weighted toward the low wage earner. In the most frequent type of pension plan (integration using the "offset 
approach"), a portion of the employee's Social Security benefit reduces the benefits payable under the pension plan.11 Rather than enhance 
the Social Security benefit received by all employees, such integration plans tend to favor those higher income employees whose replace-
ment income rate from Social Security is lower. 
Included in the debate over the roles of the sources of retirement income is the level at which pre-retirement income should be replaced. 
Munnell estimates that retirees require 50 to 80 percent of their pre-retirement earnings to maintain their living standards.12 This reduc-
tion in income requirements is due to a decrease in tax burden and a decrease in work related expenses. Some policymakers, most notably 
the President's Commission on Pension Policy in 1981, have advocated a goal of maintaining the retiree's pre-retirement standard of living 
during retirement.13 Others, such as Munnell, argue that such a goal is not feasible.14 
Regardless of the replacement level chosen as a target, there still exists the question as to whether employer-provided pension plans 
should be required of all employers. The President's Commission on Pension Policy recommended the establishment of a Minimum 
Universal Pension System (MUPS). Under this program, a minimum pension plan would be required to be established for all workers over 
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform Proposals: Pensions and Deferred Compensation (JCS-33-85), August 5,1985, p. 3. 
-37 -
Less than $10 1,462 6,294 6,270 36,983 12,352 73,360 4,027 16,321 425 1,822 1,582 -1,051 13,076 133,729 
$10-$20 1,106 9,610 2,290 17,313 3,012 22,033 3,090 21,068 531 1,881 840 1,661 3,379 73,566 
$20-$30 575 8,929 700 7,197 1,065 7,793 1,320 14,640 367 2,235 473 1,607 1,360 42,401 
$30-$40 249 4,716 294 2,866 435 2,993 544 8,296 229 1,822 258 1,071 563 21,764 
$40-$50 132 2,916 222 2,101 338 2,649 435 9,252 197 1,697 179 1,082 440 19,697 
$50-$75 207 5,417 172 1,505 331 2,464 408 10,976 197 3,624 212 2,335 420 26,321 
$75-$100 66 2,691 65 786 103 810 141 5,504 73 2,132 90 1,134 141 13,057 
$100-$200 80 4,650 66 1,241 101 794 149 8,452 88 4,305 107 3,063 149 22,505 
$200 and over 28 4,341 25 370 32 259 47 8,592 32 15,100 39 5,774 47 34,436 
Total 3,906 49,564 10,103 70,364 17,768 113,154 10,162 103,100 2,140 34,616 3,780 16,677 19,574 387,475 
1
 Includes private and public pensions plus military retirement benefits. 
2
 Includes social security and railroad retirement benefits, 
Note.—Estimated at 1983 income levels for taxable and nontaxable returns where the principal taxpayer is age 65 or over. Also included are estimated data 
for nonfilers. Detail may not add totals due to rounding. 
Source: Estimates prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation using information from the IRS Statistics of Income and the 1984 Current 
Population Survey (reported data at 1983 levels). 
Adjusted gross income 
(thousands) Re-
turns Amount 
Re-
turns Amount 
Re-
turns Amount Re-turns Amount 
Re-
turns Amount 
Re-
turns Amount 
Re-
turns Amount 
Capital gains Other income Total Interest and 
dividends 
Social Security 2 Pension 
income l 
Wages and 
salaries 
TABLE 3 
SOURCES OF INCOME FOR RETURNS OF TAXPAYERS AGE 65 OR OVER 
[Returns in thousands; amounts in millions of dollars] 
the age of 25, with one year of service, and 1,000 hours of employment with their employer. The contribution to the pension plan was recom-
mended to be 3 percent of total payroll. Vesting of benefits would be immediate. Small businesses would be able to take a tax credit of 46 per-
cent of their contribution to a MUPS, up to a limit of 3 percent of payroll.15 
Differences in the Tax Treatment of Each Component of Retirement Income 
The major tax incentives attached to employer-provided pension plans and IRAs is the opportunity to deduct the amount of the con-
tribution to the plan from the current year's taxable income and to allow the income earned by the contribution pool to accumulate tax-free 
over the life of the investment. When income and capital is later withdrawn from the pool, the amount is fully taxable. However, it is quite 
likely that the recipient's marginal tax rates at that time will be much lower than those that would have been imposed on the contribution in 
the year it was contributed. Penalties exist to discourage, or at least remove the tax advantages from, premature withdrawals from 
these plans. 
During most of Social Security's existence, the major tax advantage to the participants was the fact that the entire Social Security 
retirement benefit was excluded from income taxation upon receipt. Beginning in 1984, up to one-half of the benefit could be subject to tax-
ation. Employers are entitled to deduct from their taxable incomes the entire amount of the contribution paid on behalf of their employees. 
Employees, however, are not permitted to deduct any of their contributions to the Social Security system. This nondeductibility of Social 
Security taxes paid by employees results in a potentially costly form of double taxation. Wages are subject to the payroll tax, which is in 
turn subject to the federal income tax. This tax on a tax can be very costly to higher income wage-earners. For example, for a person at the 50 
percent marginal tax rate who is paying the maximum Social Security amount for 1985 ($2,791.80), this second tax amounts to $1,395.90. 
The Need for a More Consistent National Retirement Policy 
Future efforts to legislate changes in the tax or other treatment of a source of retirement income should not be done in isolation. 
Policymakers need to consider the effects such legislation is likely to have on the other components of retirement income and on the 
behaviors of both workers and retirees. Social Security has proven to be a much needed program for the elderly, the disabled, and the depen-
dents of deceased workers. The program should be supported and maintained for all workers and their families. However, it is becoming 
increasingly obvious that demographic changes threaten to undermine the stability of the program in the not too distant future. The tax 
rates that will be necessary to support the program at its current levels will simply be too high for workers to pay. In light of this fact, it 
becomes incumbent on government to encourage more private sector initiatives to employers and workers to provide alternative sources of 
retirement income. Workers must be educated that Social Security will provide only a basic floor of protection upon retirement, not an 
amount that will enable the beneficiary to maintain a pre-retirement lifestyle. The ultimate level of retirement income is a decision that 
each individual has to make. 
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